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 INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS, SOFT REGULATION, AND 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ROLES.  
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In this article, we briefly describe the different approaches to the regulation of 
international labor standards, and then argue for a new role for national governments 
based on soft rather than hard regulation approaches.   We argue that this new role 
shows potential for significantly enhancing progress in international labor standards, 
since it enables governments to articulate a position without having to deal with the 
enforcement issues that hard regulation mandates.  We justify this new role for 
governments based on the increasing use of soft regulation in the international arena.  Of 
course, this approach is not without its own problems, but given that existing approaches 
have all provided imperfect solutions to the problem of improving labor standards 
globally, re-visiting the role of national governments is  in our view, highly important.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The debate around international labor standards has gained increasing attention in 
the wake of rapid growth in global trade. Along the way, there have been some 
frustrations. The failure of the last WTO round and the lack of consensus on social 
dimensions of the proposed Free Trade of the Americas Agreement (FTAA) are good 
examples of the lack of progress in improving labor standards internationally. Although a 
variety of approaches exist for improving labor standards, none of them provide a 
satisfactory and viable way forward. And many of the voluntary approaches such as 
corporate codes of conduct or certification and reporting systems, are not integrated with 
prior approaches nor do they engage national governments, who can play a big role in 
supporting and extending or obfuscating these voluntary approaches.   
In our view, a consideration of the role of national governments is important. We 
realize of course that it is the failure of national governments to adequately enforce their 
own legislation that has created the problem that the current approaches are trying to 
solve.  But we feel that national governments should not be seen only as the source of the 
problem but should be included as part of the solution. This is because national 
governments offer substantial advantages in improving labor standards. More than any 
private sector system, NGOs or international agencies,   it is national governments (and 
by extension regional, sub-regional and local governments) who have more resources and 
better access to reach all types of workers and workplaces in different industrial sectors. 
Thus, national governments can take a more comprehensive approach.  Besides, focusing 
on the national government also forces consideration of an important issue, i.e. that of 
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 sovereignty. Many developing country governments have been hesitant to support the 
linkages between labor standards and free trade partly because this linkage is articulated 
and seen as being imposed by the advanced (“North” ) countries. This is a critical reason 
why national governments must be seen as part of the solution, despite their current 
ineffectiveness.    
In this article, we first examine the various current approaches to improving labor 
standards globally. Many of these approaches can be classified as “soft regulatory 
methods” rather than “hard” regulation which is most commonly manifested in 
legislation.  Taking into account the development of soft regulatory mechanisms, 
particularly in the cross-national arena, we propose a new role for national governments 
in improving labor standards. Our proposal takes into account the North-South divide on 
labor standards (the sovereignty issue) but also addresses the issue of comprehensiveness, 
since we are envisaging a more activist, rather than just regulatory, role for national 
governments. In the next section, we examine the various approaches to the improvement 
of labour standards internationally.  
 
        THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS    
Basically, the current international pressure to improve labor standards stems 
from the fundamental failure of national governments to enforce their own labor laws. 
Most labor laws in developing countries are quite comprehensive and cover the core 
labor standards (freedom of association and collective bargaining, freedom from 
discrimination, abolition of child labor and abolition of forced labor). Yet, national 
governments in developing countries have exhibited remarkable failures in enforcement, 
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 leading to the generation of international pressures to improve labor standards.  A variety 
of approaches, exist for this purpose, each with their advantages and problems. We 
discuss each of these approaches below, focusing on why they are only partial  (and 
imperfect) solutions.    
The Linkage of Labor Standards with Trade.  
 Although the efforts to formally link labor standards with trade was not successful 
in the WTO negotiation rounds, such a linkage continues to be advocated by many 
observers and some countries (e.g., the US) as the best method to improve labor 
standards.  There have been several arguments brought forward to justify this linkage. 
First, proponents argue that core labor standards ought to be seen as fundamental human 
rights. This altruistic concern for workers in poor countries tends to rise with increases in 
per capita income however, since this concern is evident mostly in very wealthy countries 
of North America and Western Europe. Second, proponents argue that such a linkage will 
prevent an “international race to the bottom”.  The argument here is that low labor 
standards will increase third world competitiveness, leading to a loss of jobs and de-
industrialization in the developed countries, and in this form to a competitive devaluation 
of labor standards through out the world.  Third, proponents argue that the legitimacy of 
the international trading system (which is seen as a cause of widening inequality and 
competitive devaluation of standards) is at stake here and enhancing the legitimacy of 
free trade requires a connected commitment and mechanism to increase labor standards. 
Fourth,  proponents argue that following a core set of labor standards will increase living 
standards all over the world. Fifth, some argue that forcing all countries to follow core 
labor standards could be efficiency enhancing in the long run. For example, abolishing 
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 child labor or extremely “cheap” labor (via no labor standards) could yield to increased 
substitution of capital for labor (thus increasing efficiency) but also leads to better longer 
term investment in human resources (as those “child” workers receive better education), 
thus increasing long term efficiency as well. Sixth, some argue that linking labor 
standards to trade would defuse the protectionist stance that is taken in some countries.  
 The evidence to sustain all of these arguments is not very strong however. For 
example, export prices of hand made carpets are significantly lower in countries with 
extensive use of child labor. There is no connection between trade flows and ratification 
of ILO conventions, although there is a connection between low labor standards (or costs) 
and inward FDI .However, one must note that not all countries with low labor costs 
attract similar levels of FDI. For instance, more than 60% of the FDI going to developing 
countries flows into just one, China, where labor costs do happen to be low.  
On the other hand, there are a number of arguments brought forward to oppose any 
linkage between trade and labor standards. This is one issue that clearly divided countries 
of the “North” and countries of the “South”, since these opposing arguments are 
advocated mostly by third world governments as well as third world employers. First, 
they argue that linking trade with labor standards is designed to protect industries in the 
“North” that would otherwise move to the “South”. Their position is supported by some 
empirical research that does not find a relationship between lower labor standards and 
competitive advantage in the marketplace (Raynauld and Vidal 1998; Gunderson 1998; 
Campbell and Sengenberger 1994). 
Second, the fact that this linkage is most clearly advocated by the United States, a 
country that has very limited commitment to improving labor standards within its own 
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 borders, re-inforces the perception that this is a protectionist device. Fourth,  “southern” 
governments argue that worker welfare is a national consumption decision (another 
sovereignty argument).  Finally, those opposing such a link note that trade sanctions are 
most likely to cause harm to workers in the short run, particularly in those factories who 
lose orders as a result of the sanctions.   
Despite the lack of agreement  at the WTO however,  the US has embarked on a 
bilateral approach that links labor standards with trade. This can be seen most recently in 
the latest US-Jordan and US-Singapore agreements, followed by the current initiative for 
a similar agreement with Morocco. And these agreements follow a history of    similar 
agreements, such as the Caribbean Basin Recovery Act and the Andean Trade Preference 
Act. More recently, the US Trade Representative, by law, must have data on the labor 
standards records of all of its trading partners, an data-collection effort that is currently 
underway by the National Academies in the US.  Thus, the failure to reach an agreement 
at the WTO has not settled the issue of a linkage between trade and labor standards, 
although, as noted, the wisdom of such a linkage is still heavily contested terrain.    
Multilateral Model: the ILO 
 The ILO seeks to promote core labor standards by advocating that its member 
nations adopt a series of conventions, with the belief that adopting a convention will 
result in the enactment of national legislation and its enforcement in member countries.  
In this way, the ILO has set a process in motion that could, by degrees, lead to better 
labor standards globally. The implementation of these conventions is left up to each 
national government. Failure to implement can result in a complaint to the ILO. 
However, the ILO does not have any punitive power and must rely on moral suasion. 
 7
 History is replete with examples of countries adopting ILO conventions and not 
implementing or enforcing labor laws. Further, at the global level, the ILO does not have 
the resources to monitor and enforce standards. 
 There are a total of 181 conventions on a range of issues. Out of a total of 175 
members, only 146 have ratified the forced labor convention, 130 have ratified the 
convention on discrimination, while 138 have ratified the convention on freedom of 
association. The US, a big proponent of improving core labor rights has only ratified 12 
conventions, and has not ratified the freedom of association and collective bargaining 
conventions. Of bigger concern is the fact that there are widespread violations of labor 
standards even in the countries that have ratified the conventions.  
The key issue for the ILO is in terms of enforcement. Many have criticized the 
ILO procedures asd not having enough “teeth”.  Yet it is important to understand that the 
ILO works in nuanced ways.  The ultimate step, that of expelling a country from the ILO 
must not be taken because that would negate any influence the ILO has over that country 
in the future. Hence it works in different ways, as we discuss below. 
  Any party recognized in the ILO tri-partite structure (government, labor, and 
business) may make representations to the ILO concerning violations, which are then 
examined by a Committee and reported in ILO publications, and to the Conference.  
Complaints may result in a Commission of Inquiry, and further action can be taken 
through the use of Article 33 of the ILO Constitution, which empowers it to take broad 
remedial action against persistent violators (Institute for International Economics, 2004).  
Article 33 states,  
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 “In the event of any Member failing to carry out within the time specified the 
recommendations, if any, contained in the report of the Commission of Inquiry, 
or in the decision of the International Court of Justice, as the case may be, the 
Governing Body may recommend to the Conference such action as it may deem 
wise and expedient to secure compliance therewith” (Americasnet, 
http://www.americasnet.net/Commentators/Bruce_Jay/jay_15.pdf). 
 
Thus, it is true that in the extreme case, the ILO does have an enforcement mechanism 
through Article 33.  However, until 2000, Article 33 had never been invoked, making it 
the first and only time in the ILO’s 85 year history.  This occurred in 2000 against Burma 
for continuous use of forced labor.  The ILO thus requested that all multilateral agencies 
of the United Nations and the Breton Woods institutions refrain from program assistance 
to Burma.  In effect, it promoted a worldwide official boycott of the country.  
Furthermore, by using reports of the use of forced labor in building the country's tourism 
infrastructure and gas pipeline to Thailand, the ILO exerted pressure on foreign investors 
and tourism companies to refrain from doing business in Burma (Institute for 
International Economics, 2004).   
 However, the case of Burma is an extreme exception to the ILOs normal handling 
of labor violations.  Until 2000, the ILO had only encouraged compliance through the 
supervisory and technical assistance systems.  However, since the birth of the linkage 
debate the ILO has taken many more proactive steps at curbing labor violations.  Along 
with the country reports, the ILO produces director general global reports which are more 
succinct and easy to read.  These reports summarize key problems in CLS 
implementation and identify specific nations with CLS violations.  One way to judge the 
potential power of these reports is the fact that several countries attempted to stop the 
director general from “naming names” or specifically listing nations with labor violations 
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 in the director general global reports (Institute for International Economics, 2004).  
During the June 2000 International Labor Conference which discussed the first global 
report, many nations criticized the Director General for pointing to specific nations for 
their violations of freedom of association.   In response, the Director General rejected the 
criticism and stated that it is the ILO’s duty to carry out transparent credible reporting.  
Furthermore, the report’s naming helped shift the policies of some Middle Eastern 
nations.  For example, Saudi Arabia announced in 2001 that it would permit the 
formation of working committees, and Bahrain decided to allow trade unions.  More 
significantly, these nations along with Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates asked 
the ILO for technical assistance in these endeavors (Institute for International Economics, 
2004).  This series of ILO actions shows that, even with its limited resources, through 
transparent reporting, it has been able to elicit changes in the face of repressive 
governments. 
The ILO, however, has shied away from clearly prioritizing violations or 
categorizing countries by degree of violation in order to avoid conflict with its members.  
However, the very act of publishing reliable data has allowed other organizations to do 
this.  In 1996 and in 2000 the OECD used ILO data and other documents to categorize 70 
countries into groups based upon their respect for the right to freedom of association.  
Similarly, a committee appointed by the US National Research Council has been 
studying ways to use  ILO and other data to develop indicators of how countries are 
faring with labor standards (Institute for International Economics, 2004).  Both are 
examples of how the ILO’s reporting of the status of labor violations in the world has 
been used by other organizations to further publicize the issues at hand.   Through the 
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 country reports and more importantly, the global reports, the ILO, as well as other 
organizations, have highlighted labor violations and therefore significant changes have 
been made in certain nations.  Thus, it is shown that the ILO’s tools, although not “teeth” 
per say, are effective, to a certain degree, at curbing CLS violations.  Hence the ILO’s 
methods must be viewed as a soft regulatory method rather than as hard legislation, and 
we realize that evaluation of effectiveness here is a difficult process.  
 
Regional Trade Agreements and Labor Standards.  
The most developed regionalization initiatives, i.e., the EU and NAFTA also have 
agreements on labor conditions. The European union follows the principle of upward 
harmonization of all relevant labor legislation, (except the case of freedom of association, 
collective bargaining and the right to strike).  The Directives proposed by the  European 
commission and adopted by the Council of Ministers are converted into national 
legislation. Thus, EU w-de standards prevail. Further, it is possible that agreements 
reached by labor and management representatives in different sectors may also result in 
directive. Thus, sectoral and cross industry agreements have the potential to raise labor 
standards throughout the community. The European case is interesting because labor 
standards are based on Europe-wide legislation in countries that have had historically 
high labor standards, a strong tradition of collective bargaining with high levels of union 
density and bargaining coverage. None of these conditions are replicated elsewhere in the 
world, and hence the possibility of the EU model being  replicated in other parts of the 
world is slim at best.  
  NAFTA’s approach is to condition each member country to respect each other’s 
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 labor laws, and to force countries (through a complicated complaint process) to enforce 
their own labor laws. While the EU’s approach clearly has the capacity to create uniform 
labor conditions in the region, NAFTA”s approach does not. Rather, the NAFTA model 
is a process that encourages countries to implement their current labor laws while 
simultaneously increasing understanding of the differences in labor laws and conditions 
across countries. Complaints about violations of labor law in one of the three countries 
must be made in either of the other two countries. The complaint may be investigated by 
the National Administrative office in, and the NAO has wide latitude to deal with these 
complaints. In cases where it has been established that there has been a failure to 
implement national law, the complaint may be referred to an expert committee (this has 
not yet been formed). In cases where there are complaints regarding failure to implement 
law for core labor standards, the complaint may be referred to an arbitration panel. 
Failure to follow panel recommendations can result in a loss of tariff preferences or fines.    
(For a detailed investigation into NAFTA’s labor side agreement, please see Compa, 
1999). Critics of NAFTA point to its narrow scope and limited powers to argue that this 
approach, while useful in educating the parties and publicizing the violations, is unlikely 
to make an appreciable impact on a large scale (EPI 2001; Compa 1999). Other recently 
emerging regionalization initiatives, such as MERCOSUR and ASEAN have not yet 
developed detailed agreements on the labor issue, although MERCOSUR has made a 
start and appears to be following the EC model. ASEAN has not discussed labor side 
issues as yet. Thus, the potential of regionalization trade models to be the vehicle by 
which core labor standards are protected seems quite restricted at present.  
Corporate Codes of Conduct 
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  Given the problems with existing methods, several “voluntary” models have also 
grown. Most common amongst these are corporate codes of conduct that draws their  
inspiration from the Sullivan principles used during the fight against apartheid. A  
plethora of codes abound, for example, corporate codes,  Trade Association Codes, Union 
sponsored codes, Multi-stakeholder codes,  Inter-government codes, and University 
Codes. Generally, the scope of codes are quite similar, focusing on the core labor 
standards but including safety, health, working hours and working conditions. (For an 
example of a typical corporate code, see www.nikebiz.com). 
 Corporate Codes have made some progress within the niche of internationally-
traded consumer goods. Codes were first established in consumer goods sectors such as 
toys, clothing, shoes and rugs. The success of corporate codes is premised on a robust 
consumer preference in high-income countries for “ethically-made” goods. They will 
succeed as long as consumers are willing to pay a premium to ensure that goods they buy 
are not made in sweatshops (Blank & Freeman 1994; Freeman 1994, 1998), or if they are 
unwilling to buy brands that do not follow basic labor standards. Thus, the impact of 
corporate codes may be ascribed at least in part to the presence of two factors: consumer 
goods and consumer preference. In the absence of these constraints, there would be little 
or no pressure to improve labor standards. It is this pressure that can be argued to form 
the basis for most corporate code movements such as the FLA, the CCC and the ETI. 
 It is important to understand that the attitudes of various different stakeholders to 
codes of conduct can be quite different.  For many large corporations, codes of conduct 
are a matter of managing public their public image, and arise out of a pre-emptive 
strategy. In other cases, they are often introduced after critical incidents, and to satisfy 
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 their own employees that company is doing something about labor conditions in 
contractor factories. However, it is also true that in the garments and athletic shoe sectors, 
many corporations have taken the implementation of their codes seriously. NGOs’ in the 
“North”,  see codes of conduct as element in the regulation of international business (see 
for example, e.g., Oxfam, Save the Children, Amnesty, Greenpeace etc). For unions, 
codes represent an inferior means of securing labor rights, and unions are quite skeptical 
of codes without independent monitoring or agreements.  Only a small percentage of 
consumers in advanced nations are willing to pay extra dollars for goods produced under 
standards imposed by does of conduct. However, these consumer groups aligned with 
other civil society groups are key actors in maintaining the pressure on corporations to 
implement their codes. Southern exporters see codes that serve to increase their costs of 
production mostly, and imposed on them by their Northern customers upon whom they 
depend for orders. Workers in the “South” often support codes, but it is also fair to say 
that on some occasions their concerns are different from what the codes focus on. For 
example young women workers may be more interested in a code provision that 
guarantees them maternity benefit rather than a code provision that limits their ability to 
earn overtime wages.  Southern governments do not oppose codes of conduct, largely 
because they are voluntary efforts by corporations.  
 Although codes of conduct are becoming more popular, research has unveiled a 
number of problems with them. First, workers who are covered by the code often don’t 
know the contents of the code of conduct, even though they are to be displayed in the 
workplace. Second, there has been a lot of dissatisfaction with monitoring of the code. 
Not all corporations monitor to see whether the code is being implemented. Of those who 
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 do, 60% do the monitoring themselves. Only 15% of corporations with codes have agreed 
to some form of independent monitoring. And the quality of monitoring is also suspect 
i.e., there are relatively few neutral monitors who have the sufficient skills and resources 
to monitor effectively.   Third, there is a very limited focus on consumer industries. 
Fourth, unions raise the issue of whether a code is beneficial absent the right to organize 
and bargain collectively. Fifth, often failure to follow the codes does not attract any 
penalties.  
 In general, corporate codes of conduct have made some progress in improving 
labor standards but their reach is limited and it is unclear if they can make a significant 
impact without the help of national governments. These efforts are likely to benefit only a 
small segment of the target workforce (OECD 2000a, 2000b; Scherrer and Greven 2001). 
It is not clear what will happen if consumer preference diminishes or disappears over 
time. What we do know is that corporate codes have diffused much more slowly in 
industry sectors whose goods are not sold directly to the consuming public.  Thus, the 
ability of voluntary models like corporate codes of conduct to significantly improve labor 
standards for the majority of workers in developing countries is also limited.  
 
Certification Approaches    
Another voluntary approach, certification approaches refer to an external body 
certifying that the factories producing certain commodities are adhering to labor 
standards, or more directly certifying that certain products are produced in accordance 
with labor standards. A number of different examples exist, such as  ISO14001, 
Rugmark, SA8000, AA1000, etc.  SA8000, for example, was launched by a coalition of 
 15
 rights activists, governments, MNCs (Avon, Dole, Toys-R-Us among others).  SA8000  
sets standards and appoints inspectors. By 2002, SA8000 had certified 58 factories 
worldwide. However, violations have been observed even in factories certified by SA 
8000 in China.  
Among the better known certification arrangements are those by the FLA (Fair 
Labor Association). Established by President Clinton’s Apparel Industry Partnership, it is 
an industry wide agreement on a code of conduct and monitoring system. The code of 
conduct focuses on a number of issues ( Forced labor, child labor, harassment/abuse, non 
discrimination, health and safety, freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
wages and benefits (minimum wage) and hours of work). The FLA certifies monitors 
(drawn from the private sector) and emphasizes both internal and external monitoring. Its 
members are Adidas_salomon, GEAR, Jostens, Joy Athletic, Levi Strauss, Liz Claiborne, 
Nike, Patagonia, Reebok, Eddie Bauer, Phillips Van Heusen, Polo Ralph Lauren. The 
FLA publishes the results of monitoring at their website. The results are quite 
encouraging in many ways as factories that subcontract to FLA members are very clearly 
making efforts to follow core-labor standards. The one area in which progress has not 
been made concerns freedom of association and collective bargaining. However, note that 
the FLA only monitors those factories that serve as subcontractors to its members, and 
thus has a very limited reach. 
 
Reporting Initiatives 
Another multilateral initiative to improve international labor standards can be 
seen in the proliferation of “reporting”  systems. The essential element of a reporting 
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 system is that it requires those corporations who agree to participate in the system to 
report on the enforcement of such standards in their own firms. The best examples of 
these are the GRI (Global Reporting Initiative) and the UN Global Compact. 
The GRI (Global Reporting Initiative) commenced in 1997 and was convened by 
the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies, and the United Nations 
Environment Program.  Currently there are participants from over 51 countries. GRI has 
a membership of over 68 NGOs and Research Institutes, over 106 global corporations, 
over 12 Business Associations, over  26 Financial Institutions, and many  Consulting 
firms,  Foundations, and universities.   
GRI ‘s basic mission is the development of globally applicable guidelines for 
reporting on economic, social, environmental performance for businesses, governments 
and NGOs.  Called the “triple bottom line” since it focused on environmental, social as 
well as financial reporting, the idea is to elevate sustainability reporting to the same level 
as financial reporting. Through a pilot program involving 21 test companies in 1999-2000 
resulted in the creation of the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 2000. 
The Global Compact is similar in that it requires members to report on a number 
of dimensions. It was started by the UN Secretary General in 1999, who asked World 
Business organizations to: Support and respect protection of international human rights, 
make sure their corporations are not complicit in human rights abuse, uphold freedom of 
assoc. and collective bargaining, uphold elimination of forced labor, uphold the 
elimination of child labor, uphold the elimination of discrimination, support a 
precautionary approach to environmental challenges, undertake to promote greater 
environmental responsibility, encourage development and diffusion of environmentally 
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 friendly technologies. Participating organizations must sign a letter of intention to 
participate and then report on their performance on the above nine principles in their 
annual report. As of 2003, there were 90 global corporations,  11 international business 
associations, 7 inter-sectoral business associations, 9 international labor unions 
federations, 11 civil society organizations, and various others participating.  
The key problems with this approach are as follows: First, it is a voluntary 
approach and not all multinational corporations participate. Second, there is no 
monitoring, i.e. no one is going to inspect to see if corporations are following the 
standards. The hope is that the transparency inherent in participation in reporting systems 
(and the danger that someone might actually check if the corporation is following core 
labor standards) will be sufficient to ensure that labor rights are expected all over the 
world. The limited participation negates this principle though.  
 In sum, there are many different approaches to improving labor standards 
globally. They are diverse, not connected or integrated with each other, and each 
approach has significant limitations. In many ways, these constitute a scattergun 
approach, where some initiatives work in some cases for certain time periods, but we are 
not closer to a general solution to the problem of labor standards.  Thus, it is good to have 
so many multi-lateral and voluntary tools for the job. On the other hand, the collective 
effectiveness of these tools need improvement. In the next section we examine the  
potential of new regulatory approaches in international industrial relations to contribute 
to the international labor standards problem.  
\ 
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 \                                  HARD AND SOFT REGULATION 
 Of late, there has been increasing interest in “soft law” and “soft regulation” 
particularly in industrial relations, particularly in the international arena. We first 
distinguish between hard and soft regulation, then examine some examples of emerging 
soft regulation in one international context, the European Union and discuss how soft 
regulation seems to be dominant in the various approaches to international labor 
standards, drawing heavily from Sisson and Marginson (2001).  We also discuss the 
implications of “ratcheting labor standards” a proposal based on soft regulation that  
holds some potential for long term solution to the labor standards issue and raises 
implications for national government roles.  
Emergence of Soft Regulation in the International Arena.  
 While there is no systematic definition of soft regulation, we best understand the 
nature of soft regulation when we distinguish it from hard regulation. The best example 
of hard regulation or hard law is an existing piece of legislation in any country. The 
legislation is characterized by a clear definition, specifies some standards, and articulates 
penalties for failure to comply with the legislation.  Thus, hard regulation is always 
“compulsory” and binding on the populations covered by it.  
 Soft regulation, on the other hand, is more diverse. Often soft regulation deals 
with a set of minimum standards or provisions, when it does tend to deal with rights and 
obligations.  Much of soft regulation is permissive, and not compulsory. Often soft 
regulation takes the form of recommendations, or opinions, or statements.  Soft 
regulation often provides for multiple interpretations of processes, whereas hard 
regulation tends to assume that the process is finished. Sisson and Marginson (2001) 
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 suggest that an important distinction between is that hard regulation might be described 
as “parfait” or complete while soft regulation is generally imparfait or incomplete.  
 A key distinction between soft and hard regulation is in terms of enforcement. In 
hard regulation, enforcement is only via sanctions or other forms of “punishment”. In soft 
regulation there is a huge variation of enforcement approaches. For example moral 
suasion, monitoring and feedback, transparency, peer group audits, bench-marking, joint 
studies, joint papers etc are a variety of methods relied on by soft regulation.  
 A final point is that soft regulation tends to appear more commonly in areas that 
have cross-border implications.  In the area of employment relations for example, most 
countries have “hard” regulation, whether it is in the form of laws or collective 
bargaining agreements. Sisson and Marginson suggest that in the EU, soft regulation 
tends to dominate in many ways.  They suggest that there are four main ways in which 
employment relations issues are dealt with in the EU.  First, hard regulation has been 
used to deal with health and safety.  Second, a mixture of hard and soft legislation has 
been used in the case of working time and European works councils, since the social 
partners required flexibility in implementing these through collective agreements. Third, 
there are soft regulations through framework agreements and joint recommendations that 
are used to “encourage” negotiation and consideration at other lower levels, but are not 
binding on them. Finally, there is another soft dimension to EU regulation in terms of 
employment policy (the open coordination method), where the approach has been to 
specify targets but let each country achieve them in its own way.   Kerstin Jacobsson 
(2004) in talking about the EU employment policy calls it a “discursive regulatory” 
method, a subtle method that includes mechanisms related to language-use, knowledge 
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 making and meaning-making. 
 The point of the above discussion is to show that soft regulation is increasingly 
used in the “international” arena.  In fact, there are many more examples of “soft” 
regulation in respect of international environmental issues rather than labor issues.  
The key question of interest is why this is the case.  Two explanations exist. The first 
concerns complexity. Sisson and Marginson (2001) essentially argue that this is due to 
the difficulty of adopting hard regulatory methods when faced with increasing 
complexity i.e. “a growing social and economic complexity stemming from the twin 
processes of differentiation and inter-dependency” in the EU.  Given the variety of 
different employment relations patterns and structures in the EU, a one-size fits all 
approach cannot be adopted. Hence,  the prevalence of soft regulation in the employment 
relations arena within the EU, or within other international arenas such as environmental 
regulation and treaties.  
 A second explanation concerns the argument that the increased use of soft 
regulation in governing transnational relations may be due to the increasing strength and 
maturity of the international system----not all relations need to be governed by law, but 
some can be left to “etiquette, social discourse and informal commitments (Shelton, 
2000: 12)  and  Jacobsson (2004:356).  While this may certainly be true in the European 
community case, where a shared understanding exists on a number of issues, we don’t see 
this as being the primary explanatory variable in terms of the emerging soft regulation 
arrangements that deal with international labor standards in the third world.  
 Third, from an international perspective, there are many practical issues which 
soft regulation helps to overcome. Keller (2000) suggests that soft regulation is just easier 
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 to achieve because conflicts of interests may be easier settled in a flexible format that 
allows the parties considerable leeway. Clearly this explanation has relevance in the 
highly contested terrain of international labor standards. 
 If one considers the development of regulation in the international labor standards 
arena, they can be all classified as “soft”.  Codes of conduct, the OECD guideline for 
multinational companies, the ILO’s tripartite declaration on social policy, the UN Global 
Compact, certification approaches all fall quite clearly under the rubric of “soft” 
regulation.  
 Clearly the degree of “softness” varies dramatically in these approaches. The 
existing international approaches also vary to the extent that soft regulation can be turned 
into hard regulation, (although we are not sure whether this should be a goal of soft 
regulation).   For example, codes of conduct are classical examples of soft regulation. 
However, more and more companies are using independent monitoring and eliminating 
those contractors who fail to meet the standards laid down in the code of conduct. This is 
one example of how soft regulation often becomes “harder” over time as sanctions are 
increasingly tied to them. More recently, the FLA board in New York was considering 
the suspension of one of its members Gildan Activewear for not following conditions laid 
down for being a participating FLA company.  Not all of the current approaches show 
promise of being concerted from soft to hard. For example, the only way in which the 
ILO approach can be converted from its “soft” moral suasion to a hard approach would 
be to expel the country  from the ILO. But this would leave the ILO with  no leverage at 
all.  
Although Sisson and Marginson (2001) state that soft regulation must be 
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 converted to hard regulation at some point so that it remains more than a statement of 
intent. They cite Wedderburn (1997:11) who argues that fundamental labor rights have to 
be built on the “hard rock” of constitutional principle or legislative provision.  We are in 
agreement, to be sure, but recall also that it is the failure of hard regulation, i.e labor law 
in developing countries that gave rise to the international pressure for labor standards. 
Thus, we argue that soft regulation approaches in the area of international labor standards 
could be developed further, but the fundamental character of “softness” must be 
maintained in order to be successful. Below, we describe one possible approach that 
would constitute development, refinement or improvement of these soft approaches.  This 
particular approach is discussed here since it helps us develop our proposal regarding 
new government roles in the following section.   
Ratcheting Labor Standards  
 The basic purpose of the Ratcheting Labor Standards approach (developed by 
Sabel, O’Rourke and Fung, 2000) is to establish a systematic competition between firms 
based on their treatment of workers. The idea is to use monitoring and public disclosure 
of working conditions to create official, social, and financial incentives for firms to 
monitor and improve labor standards through out the supply chain. Thus, Sabel, O’rourke 
and Fung (2000) argue that this transparency would enable firms to  document their 
accomplishments in such ways that will compel emulation by “laggards”.  Essentially, the 
process would work as follows: First, firms in a particular industry would be required to 
adopt some existing certified provisions (codes of conduct or SA8000 for example)  for 
monitoring their labor standards performance. The key here is to ensure that all firms in 
that particular sector participate. Currently only some do.   Second, monitoring agents 
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 would be required to make their inspections and suggestions for remediation public and 
independently verifiable. This would mean uploading their inspection results into a 
publicly accessible data base. The FLA already follows this procedure, and there are 
examples in other areas such as the Toxics Release Inventory. Participating firms must 
also be open to external verification should it become necessary. Monitors would rank the 
performance of firms under their purview, and provide information about the methods 
used for rankings to an RLS governing council (the CHIEF UMPIRE) who would ensure 
comparability standards and dissemination.  
 There are several outcomes associated with this process if it is followed. Firms 
will essentially compete to capture the right customers by improving their labor 
standards, since it is public. The monitors would also compete to improve the scope and 
reliability of their monitoring effects. Gradually, the knowledge base would grow and 
facilitate other things. For example, as it develops firms may be motivated to do more 
and “ratchet” their labor standards upwards. From the perspective of lower cost countries,     
information generated via this would lead to public debate in each country and across 
countries. For e.g. footwear conditions of work in Indonesia would be compared to those 
in country at similar levels of development. So the standards used would be broadly 
appropriate for different stages of development. As the knowledge base increases, RLS 
could be the basis for the development of common minimum standards by the 
government or international bodies that were appropriate for different industries and 
developmental contexts. It also stimulates more agents such as regulatory agencies and 
unions to participate as monitors. The key aspect is that the transparency that is central to 
this approach would bring about increased regulatory pressures on firms. For a more 
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 detailed exposition of RLS, please see Sabel et al. (2000).  RLS raises several 
implications for soft law approaches and national government roles which we explore in 
the next section.  
  
               PROPOSAL: NEW ROLES FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 
 The basic element of the proposal in this paper is that we should revisit the role of 
national governments in improving  labor standards, despite their prior failure to 
implement their own legislation. Our rationale for going back to the role of the national 
government rests on several propositions. First, we argue that national governments must 
be brought back to play an key role so that it eliminates the “north-south” divide that 
exists currently.  New regulations need to be seen as being friendly to the interests of 
both developing and industrialized countries. To accomplish this, the movement for 
better labor standards will have to shed its profile as an initiative originating in high-wage 
countries and being exported to low-wage countries. As long as new regulations are seen 
as ‘external’ initiatives, there will be resistance within developing countries to adopting 
them. What is needed is a process that will bring the issue of better labor standards into 
the internal debates within each country and at the same time overcome the sovereignty 
issues. In order for that to happen national governments need to be engaged and their 
engagement needs to go beyond their traditional regulatory roles. 
 Second, we argue that national governments must be brought back in because 
they often have better reach than other players. It is possible for national governments to 
help extend the movement towards better labor standards to pother sectors, industries and 
regions as long as there is sufficient motivation for governments to participate.  
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  Third, national governments have the capacity of significantly strengthening 
existing soft regulation methods or to even, in time turn soft regulation into harder 
regulation. The RLS for example offers, through the transparent development of a 
knowledge database, the basis for governments to act to extend standards from one sector 
to another, or to create new common minima for their countries.  At the same time, 
national governments can also play a role to ensure that the standards are appropriate for 
their own stage of development. The transparency and knowledge base inherent in RLS 
provides all the stakeholders to debate the standards that are or should be applicable at 
any point in time, and national governments can be important arbiters in this process, 
engaging employers, unions and community groups in a dialogue over labor standards.  
While such a “soft law” approach has not always attracted support from all advocates of 
labor standards, we view this role of national governments as the missing link between 
the current private initiatives on the one hand and the future “hard law” regimes that are 
expected to take shape globally, on the other hand (Verma 2003). 
 Thus, we are essentially arguing that soft regulation approaches create 
opportunities for national governments to get back into the center of the labor standards 
debate, and play a role that is quite different from the regulatory one in which they have 
failed. The key question is how they will do this.  We think that several of the current soft 
law examples serve as useful models.  For example, we have argued that to bridge the 
North-South divide, it is vitally important to internalize the labor standards debate at the 
national level within each country. In many ways, the UN’s Global Compact is a similar 
idea at the international level. This process begun at the global level could cut across all 
industry sectors. The hope behind Global Compact is that the largest corporations’ 
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 voluntary compliance would lead to a snowball effect in which other companies, 
including suppliers, would follow. This expectation is not entirely unrealistic if the 
largest 500 firms were to comply. These firms would become eager, in turn, to see that 
the others comply with similar standards. It would be in their self-interest as well others’ 
to see the standards extended as far and wide as possible. 
 At the national level, each government would initiate a process similar to Global 
Compact at the national level. The process could be initiated by at a meeting of business, 
labor and government leaders at the national level. The parties would be charged with 
developing a set of standards for firms for both their domestic and international 
operations. These standards would establish a “floor” below which the signatories would 
undertake not to operate. Given that most of the participating firms may already be above 
the “floor”, it would not be costly for them to agree to a minimum standard below. If the 
experience of other industry groups is indicative, it would be possible to arrive at a set of 
standards to which that the largest 500 firms in that country could agree.  
 The national pattern can be replicated in within various industry sectors. Initially, 
we see the process involving the largest businesses because they would have the 
resources to commit to this process. However, over time it can be gradually extended in 
stages to their own suppliers and other smaller firms that did not participate at the initial 
stages.  Further, through the example of the transparency requirements of the RLS, this 
entire issue could be publicly debated in the country.  
 An alternative “soft regulation”  approach for national governments would be to 
establish a competition, rather like the Baldridge awards for quality, in the realm of labor 
standards. Here too, principles of transparency a la RLS could be used to effectively 
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 diffuse the adoption of good labor practices.  In another variation of the soft regulation 
approach, the government could encourage a standard for the particular industry, perhaps 
through a code of conduct or through a certification system based on RLS principles. The 
national or local government could also generate appropriate incentives for firms to 
participate in the process. 
 Essentially, we are suggesting that national governments can adopt a soft 
regulation approach encourage improvements in labor standards. In order to do so, 
national governments must learn from current international efforts, since these are all 
based on soft regulation approaches. And there is a wide variety of them, as discussed in 
this paper.  
 The approach suggested here is not without its problems. A few key issues need 
to be addressed. First, what is necessary to prod national governments (which have not 
been too effective at implementing protective labor legislation) to take on this new 
activist role? Second, what mechanism or incentives can the national government use 
(beyond moral suasion) to encourage large employers to adopt the kinds of standards and 
practices that we are suggesting? Third, what mechanisms will be there to ensure that 
large employers who agree to adopt these standards are actually practicing them? Finally, 
this paper is essentially suggesting a trickle down effect from large employers to smaller 
and medium size employers. There are obvious obstacles to such trickle down processes. 
Is there a way for governments to encourage smaller employers as well to adopt these 
practices? 
One option, for a government wanting to be seen as more “activist”, is perhaps to 
provide a tax incentive, say, a percentage reduction of business or corporate taxes for 
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 those firms who adopt and comply with such practices. This is likely to increase 
adoption, as the cost of adopting core labor standards may not be as high as the reduction 
in taxes. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, in this paper, we argue for a new conceptualization of the role of national 
governments in the international labor standards debate. In conceptualizing this new role, 
we are particularly sensitive to the new international soft regulation approaches, and the 
unique advantages that accrue from involving national governments in promoting  labor 
standards through soft regulation. Our argument recognizes that we are  coming around 
full circle to the original starting point, i.e., to the national government. Yet, it is also 
clear that as globalization proceeds apace, soft regulation approaches have increased in 
importance and show greater promise than the traditional hard regulation route. We hope 
our proposal in this paper will stimulate debate on ways in which the national 
government can be seen as part of the solution, rather than as part of the problem.   
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